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DIVERSITY AND THE PRACTICE OF 
INTEREST ASSESSMENT 
ROBERT F. NAGEL† 
INTRODUCTION 
When enforcing the Constitution, courts frequently assess and 
even rank the importance of governmental interests.1 The associated 
terminology—invidious, legitimate, important, substantial, 
compelling—is a familiar part of the doctrinal landscape. Despite 
some controversies about specifics, the practice itself is usually 
accepted as a normal, perhaps, unavoidable part of constitutional 
interpretation.2 Most observers, then, take it for granted that the 
boundaries of governmental power should be located in a way that 
takes into account the importance of the state’s regulatory purpose. 
As a result, there is often only a thin line between asking whether a 
law is constitutional and asking whether it is justified. 
As congenial as this state of affairs may be to the pragmatic 
American mind, it is not inevitable. For instance, the Court’s 
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 1. Among the provisions interpreted to require judicial inquiry into the validity and 
importance of the government’s purpose are the Free Speech Clause, the religion clauses, the 
Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
the “dormant” Commerce Clause, and the Uniformity Clause of Article I, Section 8. Several 
representative doctrines are laid out in Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. 
L. REV. 166–68 nn.3–18 (1985)  
 2. One account describes the practice of taking social need into consideration when 
defining rights as one of America’s “shared constitutional first principles.” H. JEFFERSON 
POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 
205, 207 (2002). 
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determination that regulation of guns in public schools is beyond the 
commerce power rests on grounds that are entirely independent of 
whether it is a good thing to keep guns out of the hands of school 
children.3 Nor is judicial inquiry into the importance of the 
governmental interest self-evidently desirable. Indeed, it is easy to 
characterize the practice in a way that is disturbing, at least to some 
sensibilities. Suppose that, rather than saying that Constitutional 
meaning takes into account the importance of state objectives, courts 
said that the importance of these objectives justifies something less 
than a full realization of the Constitution. A society given to 
reverence for “permanent” and “fundamental” constitutional values 
might be expected to object to open acknowledgement that the 
government can diminish or ignore constitutional requirements 
simply because legislators and judges think a violation warranted. No 
doubt this is why courts usually prefer to treat the importance of the 
governmental interest as a factor relevant to the meaning of the 
document rather than as a justification for making exceptions to that 
meaning.4 
However, in upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s 
use of racial preferences in its admissions program, the Supreme 
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger5 came very close to saying that the 
importance of the state’s interest justifies an exception to or a 
suspension of correct constitutional meaning.6 Despite acknowledging 
that “there are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of 
[racial] preference”7 and, indeed, that a “core purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally 
 
 3. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (basing its holding on the fact that 
“[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, 
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce”). 
 4. An extreme example is Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), 
in which the Court relied on “a growing appreciation of public needs” to eviscerate the 
Contracts Clause even while insisting that “[e]mergency does not create power.” Id. at 442, 425. 
There are, however, some counterexamples. For instance, when first approving busing as a 
remedy for racially segregated schools, the Court observed that district courts would exceed 
their authority to remedy constitutional violations if they required bus rides that were so long as 
to threaten students’ health. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–31 
(1971). 
 5.  123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346 (2003). 
 6. See id. at 2346 (holding that “race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in 
time” because a “permanent justification for racial preferences would offend . . . equal 
protection”). 
 7. Id. at 2345 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)). 
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imposed discrimination based on race,”8 the majority concluded that 
the racial discrimination practiced by the law school was carefully 
aimed at achieving a compelling purpose, namely diversity. The Court 
therefore found no constitutional violation.9 If in twenty-five years, as 
the Justices expected, the use of racial preferences becomes 
unnecessary to achieve “the interest approved [in Grutter],” the same 
racial discrimination will, it appears, become a constitutional 
violation.10 
In this essay, I begin by discussing what it means to assert, as the 
Court did in Grutter, that the government’s interest in diversity is 
compelling. Before proceeding, I want to say a personal word about 
that topic, which I approach with considerable reluctance. This 
reluctance is based in part on my long-held sense that everything that 
can be said about affirmative action has been said many times over. It 
is also based on the knowledge that the subject of diversity in 
educational institutions is highly sensitive. Moreover, I am 
intimidated by the distance between the opposing positions on this 
issue. For most, the word “diversity” self-evidently encompasses large 
and noble goals—a “dream” as Justice O’Connor put it in Grutter.11 
But for some others, the whole idea is just as plainly hypocritical, 
empty, and pernicious. In my professional experience, the depth and 
power of this disagreement leads people to avoid the subject, a 
tendency that is encouraged by the fact that, in most universities, 
diversity programs are a solidly established fact of life. Consequently, 
although the word “diversity” and the issues it presents are widely 
and passionately discussed in journals and judicial opinions, I have 
seldom seen it seriously discussed in person among educators, even 
(or especially) while they are making real-life, professional judgments 
about admissions, curriculum, or hiring. So, for all these reasons, I 
enter this terrain reluctantly. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Supreme Court has declared that 
deference to educators’ judgments about the importance of diversity12 
justifies governmental preferences that are at odds with “a core 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,”13 those of us who have been 
 
 8. Id. at 2346 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). 
 9. Id. at 2347. 
 10. Id. at 2347. 
 11. Id. at 2341. 
 12. Id. at 2339. 
 13. See also supra text accompanying note 8 (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432).  
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reluctant ought to face up to the issue more than we have. This 
discussion, as I have stated, begins with my effort to understand what 
it means to say that diversity is a compelling purpose. It then 
proceeds to the more important question of what that understanding 
might reveal about the practice of interest assessment generally. 
I.  ASSESSING DIVERSITY 
Taken at face value, the Grutter Court’s depiction of the values 
served by diversity in higher education is certainly attractive. Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion began by adverting to Justice Powell’s 
idea that judicial respect for educational judgments about how best to 
achieve “a robust exchange of ideas” is grounded in notions of 
academic freedom and free speech.14 She then described the range of 
educational advantages achieved through a racially diverse student 
body. Not only is classroom discussion “livelier, more spirited, and 
simply more enlightening,”15 but students learn about members of 
other races and, in the process, become skeptical of racial stereotypes. 
Justice O’Connor recognized these effects as important educational 
benefits in their own right. She also said that they prepare students 
for later interactions in “an increasingly diverse workforce and 
society.”16 Her opinion went on to underscore that the ability to 
operate in an interracial society is important to the functioning of 
major organizations, including businesses and the military.17 Indeed, 
having people of diverse ethnicities participate in such organizations 
and in “civic life” more generally “is essential,” according to Justice 
O’Connor if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”18 
This dream “of one Nation” is no idle abstraction, for the opinion 
went on to claim that the “legitimacy” of this Nation’s social and 
governmental leadership requires that members of every race be 
represented in elite positions.19 
 
 14. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion)). 
 15. Id. at 2340 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 244a). 
 16. Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae American Educational Research Association et al. 
at 3). 
 17. Id. at 2340. 
 18. Id. at 2340–41. 
 19. See id. at 2341 (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity.”). 
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Thus, diversity in higher education serves not only specific 
educational purposes but also some of the same political purposes 
that the Supreme Court has on occasion claimed for its own work. 
Diversity, like certain constitutional decisions of the Court,20 is 
thought to stand as a bulwark against illegitimacy and 
fragmentation—or, put more affirmatively, as an embodiment of 
aspirations for a just society. Although the O’Connor opinion 
adhered to Justice Powell’s earlier rejection of the claim that making 
up for a diffuse history of racial discrimination is adequate to justify 
racial preferences in higher education, it ended up embracing a more 
affirmative version of that goal. Society is not permitted to look back 
to correct a history of hatred and inequality, but it may look forward 
to the achievement of harmony, cohesion, and evident fairness.21 
How, one might ask, could anyone doubt that all this represents a 
compelling public purpose? 
The answer, of course, is that critics do not take these purposes 
at face value. They begin by denying that these are the actual 
purposes of the affirmative action program at the Michigan Law 
School. As the Grutter dissenters pointed out, racial preferences at 
Michigan seem to have counted just about enough to generate 
admission rates equivalent to the percentages in the applicant pool 
and, therefore, to generate attendance rates close to the same 
proportion.22 This proportion, the dissenters charged, bore no 
relationship to the laudable objectives asserted by the University. 
How could it be, for example, that a critical mass of 1 percent Native 
Americans reflected the number necessary to vitalize class discussions 
and break down discredited stereotypes, whereas 9 percent was the 
critical mass of African Americans necessary to achieve the same 
result?23 Similarly, how could the necessity for lessons on how to 
interact with a particular race depend more on that race’s proportion 
in the applicant pool than on its relative isolation in society or the 
degree of prejudice held against it? Although the goal of political 
 
 20. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–69 (1992) (discussing the Court’s 
role in preserving governmental legitimacy); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) 
(discussing the Court’s role in preserving loyalty and national unity). 
 21. This shift in perspective was proposed as early as 1986 by Kathleen M. Sullivan in 
Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 
(1986). 
 22. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2368 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 23. See id. (reporting the admission rates for different each racial minority). 
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legitimacy might be achieved by (among other things) effective 
representation of the various races in leadership positions, 
effectiveness is not guaranteed by, or even necessarily related to, 
proportionality. More subtle preconditions for legitimacy—for 
example, Professor Robert Post’s suggestion that a democratic 
culture requires leaders who can both represent and transcend racial 
groups24—have to do with attitudes and predispositions that, even if 
furthered in some subtle way through preferential admissions 
practices, are surely not related to proportionality. In short, the 
criticism is that the racial proportionality of programs like the one at 
the Michigan Law School reveals that they cannot, in fact, be aimed 
at their announced purposes. 
Different critics see different purposes behind the design of 
affirmative action programs like Michigan’s. One obvious possibility 
is that racial proportionality is a rough measure of what is necessary 
to redress a history of racial discrimination. Indeed, the objective of 
correcting prior injustices makes some sense of the goal of racial 
proportionality. At one time proponents of affirmative action 
forthrightly argued that members of disadvantaged races should be 
represented in the classroom, in social intercourse, and in leadership 
positions in roughly the same ratio as their percentage in the whole 
population because that is an approximation of the likely distribution 
that would have existed in the absence of a history of racial prejudice 
and discrimination.25 At least arguably, the percentage of each race in 
the applicant pool may be the closest practical approximation of its 
percentage in the general population. However—so goes the 
argument—because the purpose of correcting historical inequities has 
been legally insufficient to justify racial preferences since 1977, when 
Bakke was decided, schools have had to conceal their true objectives. 
This criticism has considerable power. There can be no doubt 
that many affirmative action programs were originally undertaken to 
compensate for past discrimination; indeed, there are still outspoken 
 
 24. See Robert Post, Introduction to RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
13, 22 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998) (“Democracy . . . entails the perpetual process 
of reconciling the self-determination of autonomous wills with the collective self-determination 
of a polity.”). 
 25. Justice Brennan went so far as to argue that it was reasonable to conclude that, but for 
pervasive racial discrimination, identified minority applicants would have been more qualified 
than Bakke himself for admission to the Davis Medical School even in the absence of that 
school’s special admissions program. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 365–66 
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
NAGEL FINAL.DOC 12/20/2004  3:29 PM 
2004] DIVERSITY AND INTEREST ASSESSMENT 1521 
 
voices in the academy insisting that this is their proper purpose.26 That 
purpose would also explain why diversity proponents are intensely 
worried about racial imbalances but often seem unconcerned about 
the absence from the classroom of other kinds of groups. (If 
advocates of racial diversity have ever pushed for admission of a 
critical mass of pro-life students or religious fundamentalists or, for 
that matter, anarchists, I, like many other observers,27 must have been 
absent that day.) The objective of making up for past discrimination 
would explain why, as I observed earlier, faculties devote so little 
time and attention to discussing or studying the actual effects of racial 
diversity on classroom discussion. And it also could help explain the 
anomaly that the diversity movement, along with its ideal of robust 
interchange, should have come into full flower during approximately 
the same period when many universities have undertaken strenuous 
efforts to sanitize discourse. 
Still, even on the assumption that one main objective of most 
affirmative action admissions programs is the unspoken one of 
compensating for historical injustices, it does not follow that the 
articulated objectives are less than compelling. If for some reason it is 
true that correcting a history of racial discrimination is not a 
“compelling” purpose, the objective is not for that reason illegitimate. 
Programs motivated by remedial aims can also serve the kinds of 
purposes that the Grutter opinion endorsed. In fact, although it makes 
for some awkwardness and complexity, a program designed to 
achieve both a “compelling” purpose (like educational vigor) and a 
merely desirable purpose (like overcoming historical inequities) 
would seem, all other things being equal, not less but more justified 
than one unequivocally aimed only at a single compelling objective. If 
a governmental interest is truly important morally or politically, I 
 
 26. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 46 (2003) (reporting 
Professor Jack Balkin’s views); Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s 
Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 765 (1997) (calling “freedom fighting” the primary 
reason for seeking racial diversity in schools); James Boyd White, What’s Wrong with Our Talk 
about Race? On History, Particularity, and Affirmative Action, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1949 
(2002) (describing “past or present deprivation, discrimination, or oppression” as the primary 
purpose for affirmative action). 
 27. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 36–37, 47–48 (setting forth a variety of examples 
to show that “the arguments that universities offer with regard to ostensibly diversity-oriented 
admissions policies are underinclusive”); Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 
1105, 1106 (“What the Diversity! movement seeks is a payment made by educational 
institutions, at the expense of individuals seeking admission or employment, to compensate 
members of groups said to be disadvantaged by historic injustices to their ancestors.”). 
NAGEL FINAL.DOC 12/20/2004  3:29 PM 
1522 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1515 
cannot see why it should become less so because it was not the 
proponents’ original purpose or is not now their only purpose.28 Nor 
should it matter that it is not their primary purpose or even their real 
purpose. In such circumstances, the proponents might, to their critics, 
seem annoyingly opportunistic—perhaps even devious or 
hypocritical29—but the moral worth of the government’s interest is 
independent of the tactics or character of those who favor the 
interest. 
Of course, this rather abstract response is persuasive only if the 
educational benefits of racial diversity are real and substantial. This 
the critics deny, and it must be acknowledged that the nature and 
extent of these benefits are highly questionable. The problem is not 
merely that empirical studies are provisional and, in any event, less 
than clear-cut. The problem is that, as Professors Peter Schuck30 and 
Peter Wood31 (among others32) have argued, government programs 
aimed at generating diversity may undermine real diversity by making 
differences seem inauthentic and denatured. The problem goes 
further yet, for, as the Grutter opinion demonstrates, the idealistic 
purposes thought to justify racial preferences seem wholly 
independent of measurable outcomes. To begin with, consider the 
immediate educational benefits. Justice O’Connor contended that 
these include a robust exchange of ideas, but she also insisted that a 
robust exchange of ideas does not entail any assumption that minority 
students “always (or even consistently) express some characteristic 
minority viewpoint.”33 In fact, another educational benefit is that 
students discover that “such stereotypes” are untrue or at least that 
 
 28. For a patient exploration of the possibility—indeed, the unavoidability—of 
understanding diversity programs as serving multiple purposes, see LEVINSON, supra note 26,  
at 46. 
 29. Professor Carrington, for instance, gives voice to this understandable sense of 
exasperation when he writes, “By borrowing Justice Powell’s term for appropriate race 
consciousness, the current [diversity] movement is, not to mince words, a fraud.” Carrington, 
supra note 27, at 1106. 
 30. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE 
DISTANCE 165 (2003) (arguing that affirmative action programs “may in fact be pursuing a 
spurious or formalistic kind of diversity”). 
 31. See PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 292 (2003) (“Diversity 
itself can pose as a form of equality, at least in imagining an ideal of equalized groups.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 27, at 1143 (“[T]o treat a personal characteristic 
alone . . . as a measure of one’s capacity to contribute to intellectual exchange may actually 
reduce that capacity.”). 
 33. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003) (quoting Respondents’ Brief at 30). 
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they have “diminish[ed] force.”34 In a few highly nuanced sentences, 
then, the Court veered cheerfully from one possibility to another: (1) 
that minority group members have different enough experiences that 
they are more likely than others to provide certain ideas or 
perspectives that will be useful to classroom discussion, (2) that 
minority group members do not have identifiable viewpoints and that 
the elimination of such stereotypes is what makes their participation 
in classroom discussion so useful, and (3) that minority group 
members do have distinctive viewpoints—but only some of the 
time—and that the discovery that this is true is valuable because it 
reduces (or, one assumes, fine-tunes) racial stereotypes. In short, no 
matter what students learn from a racially diverse class, it is valuable. 
This rather flexible line of thought could be extended. The 
Court, for example, suggested that racial diversity is educationally 
beneficial because it elicits strong exchanges of views, increasing the 
energy level of the discussion.35 But, if studies were to conclude that 
racial diversity in the classroom actually inhibits discussion (on, 
perhaps, at least some sensitive issues), then this very sense of 
inhibition could be called a valuable indicator of deep feelings and 
racial insecurities. Similarly, the Court alluded to the improved 
relationships among students of different races. But, if studies were to 
show that relationships (presumably, under certain conditions) 
actually become more competitive and hostile, then this very hostility 
might be deemed an important cautionary lesson. 
Much the same is true of the more remote objectives approved in 
Grutter. Students, the Court claimed, must be prepared for interacting 
in a multiracial society.36 Such preparation would be necessary if 
American institutions and organizations in fact turn out to be 
populated by many races and if the members of those races interact a 
great deal rather than self-segregate. In this instance, the benefit 
would arise because interracial understanding would allow 
participants to adjust to the happy circumstance of racial 
intermingling. But the same preparation would also be necessary if 
some races were not proportionately represented in institutions and 
organizations or if the members tended toward noncooperation and 
self-segregation. The benefit in this circumstance would arise because 
 
 34. Id. at 2341. 
 35. Id. at 2339–40. 
 36. Id. 
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interracial understanding would allow participants to ameliorate or 
even overcome the unfortunate circumstance of racial isolation. 
Finally, it might be true that racial proportionality tends to increase 
the legitimacy of society’s leadership by creating an impression that 
representation is fair and effective. But if people do not see racially 
proportional representation as fair and effective—if some see it as a 
spoils system and others as a sign of the impossibility of achieving 
true political responsiveness—then proponents of affirmative action 
still could construe the resulting dissatisfaction as a pressing reason 
for diversity programs. After all, if legitimacy is in doubt under 
patterns of racially proportionate leadership, how much worse might 
the situation become under racially disproportionate patterns? The 
reality of racial participation at least holds the potential, over time, of 
convincing people that the system is, or is becoming, legitimate. 
At first glance, this imperviousness to falsification would seem a 
crushing problem. It suggests that proponents want affirmative action 
programs whether or not the programs produce real diversity, indeed, 
no matter what their consequences. But wait. Supporting a program 
regardless of what happens is not so strange as it first sounds. To take 
a famous and influential example, John Stuart Mill argued that 
unwelcome opinions should not be silenced whether those opinions 
are wholly true, partly true, or entirely false.37 He argued that if 
wholly true, the expression of unwelcome opinions might help truth 
to emerge; if partly true, they can refine our understanding of what is 
true; and if false, they help prevent truth from becoming dead dogma. 
Note that Mill’s argument still has force even if a true opinion is 
never accepted because his argument is only that tolerance makes the 
emergence of truth or partial truth possible.38 Similarly, the argument 
that without exposure to dissent truth will become dead dogma does 
not require that every unwelcome opinion have the effect of making 
truth more vivid. It only requires that without continuing examination 
truth will eventually become stale. Thus, Mill’s argument holds 
without regard to either the truth of the unwelcome opinion or the 
actual outcome of debate. The general conviction that untrammeled 
debate is good no matter what its immediate consequences is carried 
 
 37. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19–46 (E. Haldeman-Julius ed., Haldeman-
Julius Co. 1925) (1859) (“[S]ilencing the expression of an opinion is . . . robbing the human 
race.”). 
 38. Mill wrote, “[W]e may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the 
human mind is capable of receiving it.” Id. at 23. 
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forward to the present day in highly respected and influential 
arguments for the open marketplace of ideas. 
Mill’s argument works independently of the immediate 
consequences of tolerance because ultimately it presents an aspiration 
more than a prediction. The human capacity to reason about truth is 
mysterious; in some individuals and in some circumstances it is weak 
or nonexistent, but in others it is astonishingly potent. Mill’s 
argument rests on the conjecture or the hope that the capacity for 
truth is sufficiently available that it is worth preserving the necessary 
preconditions for its attainment. Even if, under a given set of 
conditions, no human were rational enough either to communicate or 
appreciate truth, a Millian might entertain the hope that conditions 
might change or even that treating people as rational agents might 
help transform them into rational agents. If faced with the radical 
claim that no human in any circumstance can appreciate truth, a 
determined Millian might reply that this radical claim itself could 
eventually turn out to be false and it is on this hope that dissenting 
opinions should be tolerated. The conjectural, aspirational character 
of Mill’s argument is a reflection of its scale and profundity, not a sign 
that its objective is unimportant. 
Something similar, I think, can be said of the goals of racial 
diversity programs. It does not matter what specific lessons are 
learned from members of other races or—in particular 
circumstances—whether any lessons are learned at all, because 
without diversity there is less chance of learning anything from 
members of other races. It is not dispositive that the patterns of 
interaction in society at large are uncertain because it is at least 
possible that these patterns, whether benign or hostile, will be 
improved by interracial experience at the university level. And, yes, 
the sources of political legitimacy are psychological and highly 
conjectural, but the importance of legitimacy is not for that reason 
diminished. In the end, diversity is a compelling interest because of 
the ideals and hopes that it represents. Independent of its immediate 
consequences, racial proportionality is a tangible sign of inclusion, an 
expression of good faith, an embodiment of the desire for racial 
understanding and harmony. Diversity, then, is compelling to the 
extent that it expresses shared moral norms thought essential to a 
decent society. 
Some of the most potent criticisms of affirmative action in 
university admissions concede—even celebrate—the attractiveness of 
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diversity as a societal aspiration. Professor Schuck, for example, 
perceptively describes how cultural and attitudinal variety can make 
individual choices richer and social decisions more adaptive.39 
Similarly, Professor Wood’s colorful diatribe concedes (indeed, revels 
in) the excitement and usefulness of real diversity. Wood writes, “I 
don’t know of anyone who argues that social ‘uniformity’ or ethnic 
‘homogeneity’ make for a better education or a more just society.”40 
Professors Schuck and Wood are nevertheless critics of 
government-imposed racial diversity, arguing that it has significant 
costs, such as degraded discourse and individual unfairness, and that 
it actually undermines the attractive values of real (nonengineered) 
diversity. Now, it might be tempting to jump from the claim that a 
government program entails great cost and risk to the conclusion that 
its purpose cannot be “compelling” in the doctrinal sense. However, 
efforts to implement truly great public purposes will often involve 
both high cost and risk because it is precisely the great governmental 
objectives that are considered important enough to justify large 
burdens and uncertainties. History, needless to say, is replete with 
various kinds of profoundly significant governmental initiatives—for 
example, strategies of military deterrence, educational reform 
measures, the imposition of the New York Times41 malice standard—
that have been both burdensome and uncertain. Those who oppose 
racial preference programs on instrumental grounds may well be right 
in their bleak observations and dire predictions; they may be wiser or 
more prudent, at least in the short run, than those who support such 
programs. But even valid instrumental objections concern the best 
method for achieving a set of goals. They do not establish that the 
goals themselves are politically unimportant or morally weak. 
Nevertheless, it might seem that engineered diversity cannot be a 
compelling purpose in the doctrinal sense if there is a less risky, less 
 
 39. See SCHUCK, supra note 30, at 56–72 (using four different political-social theories to 
demonstrate the values that diversity implicates). 
 40. WOOD, supra note 31, at 135; see also LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 17 (“[I]t is becoming 
ever more difficult to find anyone who is willing to say . . . that institutional or social 
homogeneity is a positive good and diversity a substantive harm.”); Carrington, supra note 27, at 
1110 (“[F]ew question the value of diverse literary, artistic, religious, or other traditions that 
may be a source of comfort, satisfaction, or pride to any group, or that contribute to the richness 
of our shared American culture.”). 
 41. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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costly way to achieve the desired objectives.42 In effect, the Grutter 
Court adopted this view when it asked whether racial diversity could 
be achieved without specific forms or degrees of racial preference. 
Surely, one might think, a program cannot have a compelling 
justification if its goals could be achieved in a different, less 
troublesome way. But, again, this argument has force only if the goals 
of diversity are understood as narrowly instrumental. It is true, of 
course, that some amount of racial diversity would exist in higher 
education without any racial preferences in admissions. It is also true, 
as the Grutter dissenters charged,43 that students can and do learn 
about attitudes associated with minority experiences long before they 
come to law school. Even in law school, students can be assigned 
books about the minority experience and, indeed, whole courses can 
be designed to meet this need. Students can visit or work in minority 
neighborhoods. Later, racial harmony in the workplace can be 
achieved the same way most work-related skills are achieved—
through on-the-job training and, assuming that racial animosities are 
costly and unpleasant, through the operation of ordinary incentives 
and experiences.44 The moral and political legitimacy of society’s 
leadership can be established in part through visibly fair competition 
and through responsive, transparent institutions. These suggestions 
for alternatives to racial proportionality are not trivial or artificial. In 
fact, against the great tides of practical experience, economic reality, 
and political life that move outside the law school, racial diversity in 
the classroom might well represent only a small eddy. 
But none of the alternative methods for achieving racial 
understanding and harmony achieves the expressive purposes 
inherent in diversity programs based on racial preferences. For one 
thing, most of the alternative methods, even if effective in some ways, 
are not purposeful collective actions and therefore cannot embody 
shared moral commitments. Even purposeful alternatives, like 
 
 42. I recognize, of course, that the Court’s formulations separate under different “prongs” 
the issue of the importance of the purpose and the issue of “less drastic means,” as if they were 
unrelated to one another. 
 43. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting 
that cross-racial understanding can be learned by “people three feet shorter and twenty years 
younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions 
ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens”). 
 44. On market pressures as a cure for racial discrimination, see generally RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION  
LAWS (1992). 
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courses designed to educate on racial history and experience, do not 
involve the same sacrifices as do diversity programs and so do not 
express the same level of moral conviction and determination. 
To summarize, then, the criticisms leveled at diversity do 
establish that it is not a compelling public objective in any immediate, 
instrumental sense. But the importance and power of diversity do not 
depend on achieving specific, measurable consequences. Diversity is 
compelling because it represents and expresses a defining aspiration. 
It is defining in the sense that its pursuit is pivotal to a vast array of 
public choices and, ultimately, to society’s fundamental conception of 
its own morality. 
Acknowledging that diversity is a compelling purpose in this 
sense does not at all imply that it is beyond criticism even as an 
aspiration. Not only are some of its immediate effects objectionable 
and its long-run consequences speculative, but, more fundamentally 
its underlying moral vision is itself controversial if only for being 
premised on race consciousness. The dream of a color-blind society, 
in which every individual’s value is independent of race, is (needless 
to say) also profoundly compelling. The very ambivalence in the 
Court’s diversity opinions manifests a recognition that on the great 
questions of social and political direction, various goals, even 
opposite ones, can represent powerful moral commitments among 
which the public is entitled to choose. 
II.  ASSESSING MORAL REGULATION 
I suspect that some who strongly approve of the Court’s decision 
in Grutter will nevertheless be uneasy with my account of why 
diversity is a compelling public interest. The reason for this unease is 
not hard to identify. If an interest as diffuse, costly, uncertain, and 
controversial as diversity is important enough to permit the 
government to override an individual’s liberty interest, there may be 
a very broad range of objectives that justify restrictions on liberty. 
Indeed, the whole enterprise of interest assessment may be in 
jeopardy. This possibility, it seems to me, is not a reason to simplify or 
distort one’s understanding of why diversity is a compelling interest. 
Rather, it is a reason to think further about the practice of interest 
assessment in constitutional cases. 
Consider the nature of the states’ interest in regulating private 
sexual conduct, an issue that the Supreme Court happened to have 
taken up at almost the same time that it was assessing the importance 
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of racial diversity at the University of Michigan Law School. In 
Lawrence v. Texas,45 the Court concluded that a criminal prohibition 
on private homosexual conduct “furthers no legitimate state interest 
which can justify . . . intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”46 A cursory reading of this sentence might leave the 
impression that the Justices were asserting that the state had no 
legitimate interest in regulating private sexual conduct. However, the 
phrasing actually suggests that Texas did have such an interest but 
that its interest, though legitimate, was not strong enough to justify a 
particular degree of intrusions into the right of privacy. Elsewhere the 
opinion acknowledged the nature of the state’s legitimate interest: 
[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been 
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable 
behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons 
these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions 
accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and 
which thus determine the course of their lives.47 
The Court quickly proceeded to say that “[t]hese considerations [did] 
not answer the question [in Lawrence,]” which was whether this 
moral position may be enforced “on the whole society through 
operation of the criminal law.”48 
In other words, although it is true that the legitimacy of the 
state’s moral position was not dispositive in Lawrence—because it 
had to be balanced against the state’s interference with the right to 
privacy—it is equally true that the importance of that moral interest 
was not wholly irrelevant. As Grutter made quite clear, even core 
constitutional interests of an individual can be sacrificed for a 
sufficiently important governmental purpose. So, the question is 
unavoidable: If diversity in higher education is a compelling 
governmental interest, is there any basis for denying that status to the 
moral objectives that animate prohibitions against homosexual 
conduct? 
The Lawrence majority suggested one answer even as it 
described Texas’s moral position respectfully. Note again its words: 
 
 45. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 2484. 
 47. Id. at 2480. 
 48. Id. 
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“For many persons, . . . [the state’s moral position reflects] profound 
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to 
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their 
lives.”49 This phrasing suggests that the moral principles animating the 
Texas prohibition are entitled to respect because their proponents use 
them in shaping their own hopes and choices. They are, the phrasing 
implies, important expressions of morality for the private domain but 
not for the public arena. Thus, if the Court had felt called upon to 
reconcile its assessment of the moral interest in suppressing 
homosexual behavior with its assessment of the government’s interest 
in racial diversity, it could have noted that those who support 
diversity in higher education are pursuing a moral vision of public 
life—a vision of how law school classes should function, of how the 
races should interact in businesses and other organizations, and of 
how society’s leadership can earn legitimacy. 
The decisive answer to this distinction between private and 
public spheres was provided long ago in Professor Ronald Dworkin’s 
“reconstruction,” as he called it, of Lord Devlin’s argument in favor 
of moral regulation.50 Professor Dworkin’s interpretation of Devlin is 
worth reading: 
If those who have homosexual desires freely indulged them, our 
social environment would change. What the changes would be 
cannot be calculated with any precision, but it is plausible to 
suppose . . . that the position of the family, as the assumed and 
natural institution around which the educational, economic and 
recreational arrangements of men center, would be undermined . . . . 
We are too sophisticated to suppose that the effects of an increase in 
homosexuality would be confined to those who participate in the 
practice . . . just as we are too sophisticated to suppose that prices 
and wages affect only those who negotiate them. The environment 
in which we and our children must live is determined . . . by patterns 
and relationships formed privately by others than ourselves.51 
Notice that this version of Lord Devlin’s argument does not depend 
on any demonstration that homosexual conduct is in itself immoral. It 
could be, as the Lawrence Court repeatedly asserted, that judgments 
about private sexual morality must be made by individuals or even 
 
 49. Id. at 2480. 
 50. Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J.  
.986 (1966). 
 51. Id. at 992–93. 
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that homosexual conduct is at least sometimes a moral good; 
nevertheless Devlin would still be right that permitting this conduct 
could lead to public harms. The right to negotiate a twelve-hour 
workday—or, for that matter, to gain admission to the Michigan Law 
School on a race-neutral basis—is not in itself immoral, yet the 
exercise of these private rights can frustrate legitimate public 
purposes. 
Professor Dworkin’s sympathetic account of Lord Devlin’s 
argument does not mean that he accepts Devlin’s conclusions. 
Dworkin attempts to rebut Devlin’s argument on its own terms.52 He 
claims that Devlin recognizes that the legislator’s decision to protect 
social institutions from private conduct is a difficult one, because the 
legislator must decide “whether the institutions which seem 
threatened are sufficiently valuable to protect at the cost of human 
freedom.”53 The legislator, however, can proceed with some 
confidence when the private behavior is immoral because in that case 
there is less need for a strong public justification. Dworkin, with 
characteristic self-assurance, proceeds to argue that the moral 
position condemning private homosexuality does not meet minimal 
social standards regarding moral reasoning. 
This criticism, even if convincing as far as it goes, is plainly an 
incomplete reply to Lord Devlin’s argument as Professor Dworkin 
himself describes that argument. Unaccountably, Dworkin loses sight 
 
 52. Professor Dworkin’s choice of counterargument does not mean, of course, that there 
are no other possible critiques of Lord Devlin’s position. Dworkin mentions in passing several 
other possible lines of attack—that society is not at all entitled to protect itself from a change in 
social institutions, or (more modestly) that the threatened change must be imminent, or that the 
immorality of an act ought not to count “in determining whether to make it criminal,” or that 
legislators must make the moral judgment for themselves and “not refer such issues to the 
community at large.” Id. at 993–94. Given Dworkin’s later writings, it is also worthwhile to 
mention the argument that moral condemnation cannot be based on religious conviction. See 
generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). Only the first two of these claims could be 
dispositive of Devlin’s argument (as Dworkin describes that argument), given that moral 
condemnation is only necessary as a justification when the value of the social institutions at risk 
is not clear. It is hard to imagine the basis for an argument that society is never entitled to 
protect itself from a destructive change in social institutions. It is possible to imagine an 
argument for the proposition that the change must be imminent, but surely such arguments lose 
force to the extent that the value of the endangered social institutions is great. The Court in 
Grutter imposed no requirement that serious risks, such as the gradual loss of governmental 
legitimacy, be imminent. The family, too, one would think, is a sufficiently valuable institution 
to warrant protection from remote risks. See infra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 53. Dworkin, supra note 50, at 993. 
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of his own recognition that Devlin’s position does not require that 
private conduct always be immoral to justify public regulation.54 It 
follows from Dworkin’s account of Devlin that it is possible for a 
legislator to be confident that threatened social institutions are highly 
valuable and that, in such circumstances, the cost in human freedom 
might be worthwhile whether or not the regulated behavior is 
immoral. Dworkin simply assumes that the institutions threatened by 
repealing antisodomy laws are not so clearly valuable as to make 
judgments about the morality of homosexuality unnecessary. 
To summarize, Professor Dworkin’s discussion shows that the 
question of whether there is a compelling public purpose in 
prohibiting private homosexual conduct is not answered by 
distinguishing between the private and public spheres and that it is 
logically separate from the question of whether the private conduct is 
moral. If the importance of the governmental interest is to be 
assessed,55 there is simply no escaping the need to identify and 
evaluate the social institutions that may be threatened by legalizing 
homosexual acts. 
The Lawrence Court, to its credit, made more of an effort at this 
essential inquiry than does Professor Dworkin. It pointed to various 
pieces of evidence suggesting that a strong social consensus in favor 
of outlawing private homosexual acts no longer exists.56 This 
information is relevant to an assessment of the importance of the 
state’s interest because, to the extent that a society does not aspire to 
the sorts of relationships, institutions, and ideals that would be 
undermined by legalized homosexuality, that society would not be 
threatened by such legalization. However, if one agrees with the 
Court that racial diversity in higher education is a compelling 
governmental interest, it is obvious that significant social dissensus 
 
 54. Professor Dworkin’s words are: 
We do not need so strong a justification, in terms of the social importance of the 
institutions being protected, if we are confident that no one has a moral right to do 
what we want to prohibit . . . . This does not claim that immorality is sufficient to 
make conduct criminal; it argues, rather, that on occasion it is necessary. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 55. Professor Dworkin’s argument against Lord Devlin’s position is entirely addressed to 
moral assessment by legislators, not courts. Oddly, he adds a postscript on the question of moral 
regulation of pornography that simply assumes that the same argument applies to judicial 
decisionmaking. See id. at 1002–05. 
 56. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478–81 (2003) (noting, for example, that at the 
time of the Court’s decision in Lawrence, only thirteen states prohibited sodomy, four of which 
enforced their laws only against homosexuals). 
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cannot, in itself, be sufficient to discredit a public purpose. After all, 
the value of diversity programs is hotly contested in the political 
arena, and, indeed, those programs are arguably incompatible with a 
powerful, authoritatively expressed political consensus in favor of 
nondiscrimination. Grutter is, I think, commonsensical on this point. 
Whatever the ultimate boundaries of Lord Devlin’s argument for the 
right of societal self-definition, it cannot be that a state’s purposes are 
compelling only when they are noncontroversial. The great issues of 
politics and morality are always controversial. 
Fortunately, for present purposes it is not important to identify 
the degree of consensus that Lord Devlin’s argument might require 
before the state undertakes moral regulation on profound and 
controversial issues. Whatever the abstract answer to that question, in 
Lawrence the Justices effectively conceded that there is sufficient 
social consensus about the importance of at least one of the 
institutions that legalized homosexuality might threaten. Both the 
majority opinion57 and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion58 
sharply distinguished criminal prohibitions against homosexuality 
from the validity of existing laws regulating marriage. And well they 
might, for marriage is the primary institution that has been used all 
over the world to tame the turbulent power of human sexuality, to 
raise psychologically healthy children, to instill moral values, and to 
provide for some degree of mutual protection and support. Whatever 
its variations and shortcomings, if there is not sufficient social 
consensus regarding the importance of the institution of heterosexual 
marriage, it is hard to imagine any social arrangement the protection 
of which could amount to a compelling interest. This is true 
notwithstanding the existence of alternative models to traditional 
marriage that are morally attractive and compatible with 
homosexuality. A public purpose does not cease to be compelling 
merely because deeply attractive alternatives exist, as Grutter’s 
acknowledgement of the dream of a color-blind society as an 
alternative to engineered diversity reminds us. 
 
 57. See id. at 2478 (distinguishing antisodomy laws from efforts by the state to define 
personal relationships when there is “injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law 
protects”); id. at 2484 (“[This] case does not . . . . involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”). 
 58. See id. at 2488 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex 
relations—the asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the institution 
of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”). 
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Lawrence might seem to rest on the belief that the state’s interest 
in protecting the institution of marriage, although morally compelling, 
is only tenuously connected to the prohibited conduct. Many have 
argued—and the Court seems to have been sure—that legalizing 
homosexual sodomy will not lead to any destructive consequences for 
family life. Indeed, arguments are available for the proposition that 
even extending the right to marry to homosexuals (let alone 
decriminalizing homosexual conduct) would be compatible with 
wholesome family life. Once again, however, this explanation for 
Lawrence is undermined by the Grutter Court’s determination that 
racial diversity in higher education is a compelling public purpose. 
Recall that every aspect of that purpose—the invigoration of 
classroom discussion, the improvement of racial attitudes, the 
achievement of harmony in the workplace, the legitimation of the 
leadership class—is highly conjectural and, indeed, that diversity can 
be and is viewed as a compelling interest no matter what the 
immediate consequences. The Grutter opinion rested on the 
proposition that great dreams, like the aspiration for racial harmony 
and fairness, are sufficiently crucial to a society’s self-definition that 
they can be worth expressing and pursuing despite the uncertainties 
attending social causation in a complex and subtle world. 
Even if legalized homosexuality might have some effect on social 
climate that could indirectly undermine marriage, it is, obviously, 
possible to protect marriage by more direct means than through the 
regulation of homosexual behavior. However, Grutter also reminds us 
that the fact that certain tangible objectives might be achieved by 
more direct or limited means does not make the expressive functions 
of public laws any less crucial to a society that ultimately reflects the 
character and attitudes of those who comprise it. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s determination that racial diversity in higher 
education is a compelling interest is, I have tried to demonstrate, 
persuasive, but it is persuasive only on terms that confirm what 
should have been obvious from the beginning. What should have 
been obvious is that the nature of great social purposes is such that 
they cannot be authoritatively ranked by judges or, for that matter, by 
anyone else. They are the appropriate subject matter of continuing 
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disagreement.59 Controversy, uncertainty, speculation, sacrifice—
these do not make purposes unimportant. They identify ideals, they 
characterize dreams. American citizens have become inured to a 
practice that is, I think, beyond justification. Much more is at stake in 
recognizing this than the decisions on racial diversity and private 
homosexual conduct. The practice of interest assessment reaches very 
far; it constrains collective decisionmaking on moral issues that are 
fundamental to society—establishing decent public dialogue, 
fostering respect for human life, redressing a history of racial 
discrimination, and fostering a minimal sense of respect for the 
country. 
Recognizing that courts cannot rank a society’s aspirations for 
itself does not mean that all laws are constitutional. It means that 
when courts invalidate a law, they should do so on some basis other 
than interest assessment.60 But it must be acknowledged that, 
depending on what inquiries are substituted for the royal prerogative 
of interest deprecation, it is certainly possible that most laws would 
survive constitutional review. This leads us back to the question that I 
started with: How should one understand cases like Grutter in which 
the Court validates a law on the ground that the public’s judgment 
about the importance of a public purpose is entitled to judicial 
respect? In such cases, should we understand the Court to be 
authorizing the government to limit or amend the Constitution 
merely because that seems justified to those in power? Or is the 
better understanding that the Court is somehow allowing the 
importance of governmental interests to define the meaning of our 
Constitution? 
As Grutter made explicit, there has always been a certain 
implausibility in the common claim that a court does not qualify or 
undermine constitutional limits when it validates a law on the ground 
that the governmental interest is compelling. However, if we see the 
Constitution not only as a legal document but also as a set of political 
practices and understandings, this implausibility recedes. From this 
perspective, it is the people’s judgment about the importance of their 
 
 59. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
 60. There may be exceptions, of course; for example, the text of the Fourth Amendment, 
referring to “unreasonable searches and seizures,” may direct a court to evaluate society’s 
interests. 
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objectives that informs and qualifies constitutional meaning.61 The 
courts, in this circumstance, are not deferring to extraneous 
judgments about social utility and moral aspiration. They are making 
room for an aspect of constitutional self-definition that is inherently 
political and cultural. This distinction is not at all a scholastic 
subterfuge. It is realistic and accurate to describe the American 
Constitution both as a legal document and as a set of political 
understandings and arrangements.62 It follows from this recognition 
that, insofar as the constitutionality of laws is thought to depend on 
the legitimacy and importance of the public’s purposes, this aspect of 
constitutional decisionmaking belongs to the public at large. For the 
Court to understand this would not be abdication. 
 
 61. Unfortunately, the Grutter Court’s deference to university faculties and other elite 
groups provides only limited evidence that it appreciates this possibility. The opinions of these 
groups are not broadly representative of the whole population; moreover, their opinions on 
diversity adopt the position taken by one of the Court’s own members years earlier in Bakke. 
To the extent that Justice Powell’s opinion shaped subsequent policies and opinions on 
diversity, the Court in Grutter is, in effect, deferring to itself. On the way in which Bakke shaped 
public discourse on the issue of diversity, see LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 16. 
 62. Even the Court sometimes acknowledges the political nature of constitutional law, as 
when it relies on the continuing repudiation of the Sedition Act as a basis for the conclusion that 
defamations of public officials enjoy a partial First Amendment privilege, see N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964), or when it looks to sustained political traditions as a way of 
defining “liberty” in the Due Process Clause, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 
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